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Abstract 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of executive functions (EFs) in 
different strategies underlying risky decision making. Adult participants from a nonclinical 
sample were assigned to low or high EF groups based on their performance on EF tasks 
measuring shifting, updating, and inhibition. ERPs were recorded while participants 
performed the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In this task, each balloon pump was 
associated with either a reward or a balloon pop with unknown probability. The BART 
behavioral measures did not show between-group differences. However, the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN) associated with undesirable outcomes was larger in the high EF group than 
in the low EF group. Since the FRN represents salience prediction error, our results suggest 
that the high EF group formed internal models that were violated by the outcomes. Thus, we 
provided ERP evidence for EFs influencing risky decision making processes. 
 
Keywords: Balloon Analogue Risk Task; event-related brain potentials (ERPs); 
decision making; executive functions; feedback-related negativity; model-based learning; 
risk-taking behavior 
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Different strategies underlying uncertain decision making: Higher executive performance 
is associated with enhanced feedback-related negativity 
 
The detection and evaluation of external feedback is a crucial factor of adaptive 
decision making (Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Warren & Holroyd, 2012). Converging evidence 
shows that executive functions (EFs) mediate decision making under explicit risk (Brand, 
Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Schiebener, Wegmann, Pawlikowski, & Brand, 2012). 
However, the exact relationship between feedback processing and EFs is still unclear. Event-
related brain potential (ERP) correlates of feedback processing, like the feedback-related 
negativity (FRN), could indicate the need to adjust performance during decision making, 
which is probably influenced by the EFs (Mushtaq, Bland, & Schaefer, 2011). Specifically, 
altered feedback processing and decision making have been shown in those clinical 
syndromes (e.g., ADHD, substance abuse, anxiety) that are associated with atypical EFs (Bari 
& Robbins, 2013; Gu, Huang, & Luo, 2010; Onoda, Abe, & Yamaguchi, 2010). Therefore, 
the aim of the present study was to investigate how individual differences in EF performance 
among healthy participants contribute to various strategies underlying uncertain decision 
making. To this end, ERPs were measured in a task that mimics real-life choice situations. 
The feedback-related negativity (FRN) is a frontocentral negative deflection that 
occurs 200–300 ms after a negative feedback is presented (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Talmi, 
Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013). The FRN is thought to mirror rapid feedback evaluation and 
phasic dopaminergic changes in activity between the basal ganglia and the anterior cingulate 
cortex, as proposed by the reinforcement learning theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). These 
neural structures together with the prefrontal cortex also underlie cognitive control (e.g., 
Arnsten & Rubia, 2012; Mushtaq et al., 2011). The FRN could express salience prediction 
errors, as well, since the component has been sensitive to both negative and positive 
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unexpected events in a recent study (Talmi et al., 2013). The FRN is usually followed by a 
P3, which is sensitive to cognitive control and represents a more elaborated evaluation of 
outcomes (Euser et al., 2013).  
During reward-based learning the gating of new information necessarily involves 
activation of the prefrontal cortex (Chatham et al., 2011; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). As a 
common prefrontal function, the EFs is not a unitary construct, rather a set of goal-directed 
control mechanisms including inhibition, mental set shifting, and working memory as the 
three main subprocesses (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Miyake & Friedman, 
2012; Miyake et al., 2000). Behavior regulation in situations of emotional or motivational 
significance is often considered as an aspect of EFs measured by delay discounting tasks, 
probabilistic learning tasks, and gambling tasks (Lejuez et al., 2002; Zelazo, Qu, & Kesek, 
2010). Previous studies showed that the FRN indicates the motivational significance of 
negative events in these specific EF tasks (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Yeung, 
Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005). 
A common feature of these tasks is decision uncertainty, which implies that none of 
the response options is considered more advantageous than the other, since no sufficient 
information is available about outcome probabilities (Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). The concepts of decision uncertainty and EFs are related in a specific 
respect: During task-solving, the presence of uncertainty might increase the need for 
monitoring performance and adjusting ongoing behavior that are also subprocesses of the EFs 
(Mushtaq et al., 2011). These subprocesses can be investigated through the FRN in decision 
making tasks (Walsh & Anderson, 2012).  
Among tasks investigating the underlying factors of risky decision making and real-
world risk-taking, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) is one of the most widely used 
(Lejuez et al., 2002). In this gambling task, participants pump a balloon and each pump is 
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associated with either a reward or a balloon pop with unknown probability. After each 
successful pump, participants could either stop and collect the accumulated reward, or 
continue with a balloon pump. If the balloon pops, the accumulated reward is lost. The 
probability of a balloon pop increases with each successive pump, but the regularity that 
determines balloon pops is unbeknown to participants (Lejuez et al., 2002).  
It has been shown that FRN can be elicited by negative events in the BART (Euser, 
van Meel, Snelleman, & Franken, 2011; Fein & Chang, 2008). Some theoretical and empirical 
frameworks have been delineated that might contribute to clarifying the impact of EFs on 
FRN in the BART. Figure 1 depicts how these perspectives influence each relevant step of 
decision making, and Table 1 summarizes the basic premises and consequences of each 
perspective. Hereafter, we summarize these frameworks and accordingly formulate the main 
assumptions. 
The decision situation in the BART provides information about possible gains and 
losses and about the outcome of decisions associated with the previous balloon (for more 
specific details, see section Method). For instance, if the participant saw that the last balloon 
popped after gaining 15 points (5 pumps), he/she would consider the initiation of a further 
pump after 10 points (4 pumps) a risky decision in the actual context. In addition, the decision 
situation might remind the individual to other similar gambling conditions. Therefore, 
expectations about possible consequences of the subsequent decision could be formed on the 
basis of previous experience, the known or putative probabilities of different outcomes, the 
number of remaining trials, and the total amount of reward gained until a certain time point. 
These pieces of specific information and general problem solving strategies are retrieved from 
long-term memory, which is monitored by the EFs. Then EFs also control the use of this 
information in selecting an appropriate decision strategy, which could be influenced by 
unconscious signals, namely the somatic markers (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 
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2005). Finally, each decision yields different types of feedback that violates or confirms 
previous expectations and later acts as a somatic marker (see also the original approach of 
Brand et al., 2006, p. 1272). 
In regard to the decision strategy, there are at least two ways for adaptive response 
modification (Nemeth, Janacsek, Polner, & Kovacs, 2013). First, model-based learning could 
guide individuals’ choices through testing different hypotheses about the structure of the 
current task. This strategy is suggested to be partly related to executive control processes. 
Second, the structure of the task could be learned in a hypothesis-free way with less reliance 
on models (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Janacsek, Fiser, & Nemeth, 2012). A previous study 
compared low and high EF participants in a probabilistic sequence learning paradigm and 
found striking differences between the two groups (Nemeth et al., 2013). While in the normal 
alert state high EF participants showed decreased performance as compared to low EF 
participants, the high EF group’s sequence learning was enhanced in the hypnotic state. The 
latter result was interpreted as the attenuating effect of hypnosis on frontal lobe functions 
(Gruzelier, 2006). 
Similarly, some previous evidence suggests that optimal performance on the BART 
might not require superior EFs. The study of Fecteau et al. (2007) using transcranial direct 
current stimulation showed that enhanced bilateral activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex yielded a more conservative and risk-averse response style (i.e., lower number of 
pumps). Likewise, a recent fMRI study showed that cognitive control networks were more 
active before safe choices (on trials preceding the accumulation of reward) than before risky 
choices (on trials preceding a further pump), which suggests the essential role of control 
processes in risk avoidance (Helfinstein et al., 2014).   
The probabilistic structure of the BART also affects decision strategies. Gambling 
tasks based on uncertain decisions differ in what extent they involve decisions under risk 
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(when the outcome probabilities are known) or ambiguity (when the occurrence of a specific 
outcome is unknown) (Bechara et al., 2005). According to the notion of Brand et al. (2006), 
decision making under risk depends more on the EFs than decision making under ambiguity. 
The BART involves decisions under ambiguity (Fecteau et al., 2007), since the safe choice 
(collect the accumulated reward) is obvious to participants, but the exact probability of the 
outcomes associated with the risky choice (successive pump) remains largely unclear during 
the entire task. Therefore, the BART performance might be less related to EFs (Campbell, 
Samartgis, & Crowe, 2013; Fecteau et al., 2007). At the same time, the use of somatic 
markers or heuristics towards certain responses could be essential in gaining experience with 
the structure of the task.  
We propose that these frameworks predict how individual differences in EFs modulate 
behavioral performance and FRN/P3 on the BART (see Table 1). Participants with high EFs 
might use a model-based strategy when choosing between response options. This could 
involve the forming of outcome expectations on the basis of internal models. Since the FRN 
reflects salience prediction errors (Talmi et al., 2013), the violation of outcome expectations 
might elicit a larger FRN than when no conscious expectations have been formed. At the 
same time, enhanced cognitive control (EFs) and conscious performance monitoring per se 
could yield larger FRN (Mushtaq et al., 2011). According to previous results (Fecteau et al., 
2007; Helfinstein et al., 2014), individuals with high EFs would show decreased risk-taking at 
the behavioral level, which eventuates the accumulation of reward instead of initiating a 
further pump. This contradicts, however, that ambiguous decisions might not depend on the 
EFs (Brand et al., 2006). The BART could be solved by following response preferences based 
on somatic markers (Bechara et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2006), as well, which would more 
likely characterize participants with low EFs.  
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Consequently, in the present study, we assumed that participants with high EFs would 
solve the BART with a different underlying strategy. We expected larger FRN amplitude in 
the high EF than in the low EF group reflecting enhanced feedback processing. However, we 
assumed not to find between-group difference in the behavioral performance, since EFs seem 
to be less involved in decisions under ambiguity (Brand et al., 2006).
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the trial structure in the BART and the steps of decision making. A screen with five objects was displayed; at 
each new balloon, a zero was presented in the middle of the sphere. “Total score” depicted the points in the permanent bank, “Last balloon” 
depicted the points collected from the previous balloon. Participants could choose to collect the accumulated points from the actual balloon, 
which ended the trial, or they could choose to pump the balloon further. As a consequence of a pump, a negative feedback (balloon burst) or a 
positive feedback (larger balloon with more points inside) could have appeared. Negative feedback also ended the trial and a new balloon was 
presented. 
Dashed arrows indicate the steps of decision making on the basis of previous theoretical or empirical frameworks. Grey-shaded boxes present the 
main steps of decision making, while transparent boxes present the involved processes and background mechanisms. The dotted line depicts the 
direct path through the limbic loop between somatic markers and the decision per se. This illustration is an adapted and amended version of 
figures published by Brand et al. (2006, p. 1273) and by Fein and Chang (2008, p. 144). For more details, see text and Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of relevant theoretical and empirical frameworks. 
Framework Premises Predictions/Consequences 
Model-based vs. model-free learning  
(Nemeth et al., 2013) 
Model-based learning involves testing hypotheses about the 
structure of the task. 
Internal models could be established about the distribution of 
balloon bursts. 
Model-based learning, at least in part, depends on higher cognitive  
control processes (i.e., higher EFs). 
Model-free learning is more effective than model-based learning in 
ambiguous decision making situations. 
Higher EFs are associated with model-based learning. 
Constant updating of working memory in case of model-
based learning. 
Lower total score (less effective task-solving) in case of 
model-based learning. 
 
Perception of ambiguity and/or risk  
(Brand et al., 2006) 
Decision making under risk is more dependent upon EFs than 
decision making under ambiguity. 
The BART involves decision making under ambiguity: The explicit 
risk (outcome probability) of a given pump is unknown. 
The level of EFs and BART behavioral performance are 
independent. 
Salience prediction error 
(Talmi et al., 2013) 
The FRN reflects prediction errors associated with motivational 
salience. 
Balloon bursts are salient events.  
Balloon bursts are more salient for those who expect balloon 
increase.  
Balloon bursts as salient events elicit larger FRN. 
The FRN is larger for those who expect balloon increase. 
Enhanced cognitive control 
(Fecteau et al., 2007; Helfinstein et al., 2014) 
Activation of the prefrontal cortex decreases risk-taking.  
Greater activation can be found in the extensive networks of 
cognitive control before safe choices on the BART. 
More risk-averse response style (less pumps) in the high 
EF group. 
Larger FRN and P3 amplitude for balloon bursts in the 
high EF group. 
Running head: THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE CONTROL IN RISK-TAKING 12 
Method 
Participants 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the sample. Thirty-nine 
undergraduate students took part in the experiment. Altogether seven of them were excluded 
by reason of excessive artifacts or not having sufficient number of negative-feedback locked 
epochs (see section EEG Recording and Analysis). Thirty-two young adults remained in the 
final sample. They were assigned to two groups according to their performance on tasks 
measuring EFs (see sections Neuropsychological Measures and Data Analysis). All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, reported normal hearing, and provided 
informed consent to the procedures as approved by the Institutional Review Board of Eötvös 
Loránd University, Hungary. Participants received course credit for taking part in the ERP 
experiment. 
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Table 2. Descriptive data of demographic variables, rating scales, EF performance, and basic 
behavioral measures of the BART in low EF and high EF groups. 
 
Low EF (n = 16) High EF (n = 16)  
t / χ2 / Z 
 
M (SD) M (SD) 
Age [years] 21.1 (1.4) 21.4 (1.7) n.s. 
Male / Female 
a
 1 / 15 3 / 13 n.s. 
Left / Right handed 
a
 3 / 13 2 / 14 n.s. 
BIS TS 59.6 (11.2) 63.9 (10.2) n.s. 
BSSS TS 17.3 (4.8) 16.1 (5.5) n.s. 
STAI-T 40.6 (10.3)  34.8 (10.6)  n.s.  
BDI TS 
b
 11.6 (3.1) 10.3(1.4) n.s. 
Verbal Fluency [correct items] 97.4 (11.8) 120.8 (15.6) -4.78*** 
Listening span level 
b
 2.8 (0.3) 3.7 (0.9) -2.61** 
Go/No-Go [discriminability] 0.22 (0.16) 0.42 (0.27) -2.48* 
EF index [z-score] -0.54 (0.21) 0.54 (0.45) -8.60*** 
Mean adjusted pumps 8.8 (1.7) 8.5 (1.6) n.s. 
Number of balloon bursts 
b
 38.8 (10.2) 40.2 (10.4) n.s. 
Mean score before bursts 24.49 (7.96) 23.40 (7.76) n.s. 
Total score 2258.3 (354.7) 2065.1 (395.5) n.s. 
Note. 
a
 = in case of cells with an expected count less than five, exact significance tests were selected for 
Pearson’s chi-square. b = in case of violating the assumption of normality, Mann-Whitney U tests were 
performed. BIS TS = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale total score; BSSS TS = Brief Sensation Seeking Scale total 
score; STAI-T = T-Anxiety score; BDI TS = Beck Depression Inventory short version total score.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) Implementation 
Figure 1 illustrates the modified version of the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) that was 
originally designed by Fein and Chang (2008). The general structure and appearance of the 
task was the same as described by Fein and Chang (2008, p. 143), but some modifications 
were implemented to optimize the paradigm for ERP analysis. Participants were asked to 
pump a balloon (increase its size and value) by pressing one of the response keys on a Cedrus 
RB-530 response pad (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA).  
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The probability of the balloon popping and the score to be lost if the balloon popped 
increased with each successive pump. There were two possible outcomes for each balloon 
pump: (1) the balloon inflated incrementally and the score presented inside the balloon 
increased (positive feedback), (2) the balloon popped and the score shown inside was lost 
(negative feedback). The pop stimulus was a silent balloon burst, which preserved the features 
of a medium-sized balloon picture (no text was presented). Upon balloon presentation, 
participants could end the actual trial and collect the score from the balloon (temporary bank) 
instead of choosing to pump the balloon again.  
The task consisted of 90 balloons to increase the probability of obtaining sufficient 
number of negative feedback-locked epochs for averaging. The maximum breaking point was 
20 pumps for each balloon; after the 20
th
 pump, the balloon popped inevitably. Pops resulting 
from the first and seconds pumps of the balloon were disabled. The probability of the balloon 
popping after the third pump was 1/18, after the fourth pump was 1/17, and so on, until the 
20
th
 pump, where the probability of balloon pop was 1/1. This design produced an 
experimental session lasting no longer than about 25-30 minutes. We increased the rewards 
by one point at each pump: The first pump added 1 point to the temporary bank, the second 
added 2 points, the third 3 points, and so on.  
After a balloon appeared on the screen, participants had unlimited time for each pump 
to initiate or to collect the accumulated reward. A random delay of 1000-1200 ms was 
inserted between each possible response and feedback stimulus. The negative feedback 
stimulus and the screen which indicated that participants transferred the accumulated scores to 
the permanent bank were displayed for 3000 ms. The new empty balloon appeared 10 ms 
after these events.  
The major behavioral measures for the BART were the mean adjusted number of 
pumps across balloons (mean number of pumps on balloons that did not explode; for this 
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convention, see Lejuez et al., 2002), the number of balloon bursts, the mean score before 
bursts, and the total score at the end of the experiment. 
Participants were instructed to collect as many points as possible. With regard to the 
reward scheme, each of them was told that if they exceeded the mean of total scores gained by 
those participants playing the BART before them, they would receive an extra course credit. 
After completing the task, they were informed about the prior criterion and whether they have 
attained it or not. 
 
Neuropsychological Measures 
EFs were measured with different neuropsychological tasks: Participants performed a 
Verbal Fluency Task, a Listening Span Task, and a Go/No-Go Task. With the selection of 
these tasks, we intended to tap the three main subprocesses of EFs: shifting, updating/working 
memory, and inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000). 
 
Verbal Fluency Task 
Three subtasks were administered as part of the Verbal Fluency Task (Lezak, 
Howieson, & Loring, 2004; Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D'Elia, 2005; for the Hungarian 
version, see Tánczos, Janacsek, & Németh, 2014a; Tánczos, Janacsek, & Németh, 2014b). 
First, participants were required to say words that begin with a specified phoneme (K, T, and 
S, respectively; phonemic fluency). Second, they were asked to recite animals and then fruit 
items (semantic fluency). Finally, participants had to alternate between producing items from 
two categories: “clothes” and “musical instruments” (category switching). Participants were 
given 60 seconds to generate as many different words as possible in each subtask. The total 
number of correct items was used as an outcome variable. 
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Listening Span Task 
In this verbal working memory task (Daneman & Blennerhassett, 1984; Hungarian 
version: Janacsek, Tánczos, Mészáros, & Németh, 2009) participants listened to blocks of 
sentences read by the experimenter. Each block consisted of two to eight short sentences, and 
three different block sequences were used (each consisted of 7 blocks). To ensure the 
comprehension of sentences, participants had to give true/false responses following each 
sentence. After all sentences have been presented in the given block, participants were asked 
to recall the last word of each sentence. The actual sequence terminated when participants 
failed to recall the last words in the correct order. Then the experimenter started the next 
sequence from the first block. The mean level (i.e., number of words) at which a participant 
was correct in every sequence was taken as a measure of listening span. 
 
Go/No-Go Task 
Participants performed a two-tone Go/No-Go Task (adapted from Gaál, Csuhaj, & 
Molnár, 2007) in order to measure response inhibition and selective attention. A series of 
tones were presented binaurally via headphones (250 stimuli with 50 ms duration each; ISI: 
500 ms). The sequence of No-Go trials (tones of 1000 Hz; .8 probability) was interrupted by 
Go trials (tones of 1030 Hz; .2 probability) according to a pseudorandom order. Participants 
were instructed to press a target button as accurately and rapidly as possible at the occurrence 
of the high frequency tone, but to withhold a response for the low frequency tone. A 
discriminability index (see Hershey et al., 2010) was calculated as hit rate (proportion of 
correct Go trials) minus false alarm rate (proportion of incorrect No-Go trials) to indicate the 
level of performance.  
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Procedure 
Before coming to the laboratory, participants filled out four questionnaires online. The 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; translated to 
Hungarian by Anna Székely, Zsolt Demetrovics, and Sándor Rózsa; see also Varga et al., 
2012), the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS; Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & 
Donohew, 2002; Hungarian version: Urbán, 2010), the Beck Depression Inventory short 
version (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; Hungarian short version: 
Rózsa, Szádóczky, & Füredi, 2001), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Hungarian 
version: Sipos & Sipos, 1983; STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) were 
administered to assess impulsivity, sensation seeking, depression, and anxiety, respectively. 
This pre-testing phase aimed to control the confounding effects of personality traits on the 
measured ERPs (Cohen, Wilmes, & Vijver, 2011; Mushtaq et al., 2011; Onoda et al., 2010). 
The session at the laboratory begun with EEG data collection while performing the 
BART. Neuropsychological testing followed the removal of the electrode net. The whole 
procedure lasted about 80 minutes. The BART and the Go/No-Go Task were written in 
Presentation software (v. 16.3; Neurobehavioral Systems).  
 
EEG Recording and Analysis 
EEG activity was recorded by using the Electrical Geodesics system (GES 300; 
Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR) with a 128-channel Geodesic Sensor Net. We used 
Cz as a reference, and a sampling rate of 500 Hz was applied with a 70 Hz online low-pass 
filter.  
Before starting any offline analysis, spline interpolation of bad electrodes was 
performed if necessary. During pre-processing, the data were first band-pass filtered offline 
between 0.3 – 30 Hz (48 dB/oct), and notch filtered at 50 Hz. Eye-movement artifacts and 
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heartbeats were corrected with independent component analysis (ICA; Delorme, Sejnowski, 
& Makeig, 2007). After, EEG data were re-referenced to the mean activity of all electrodes. 
Epochs extended from -100 to 1000 ms relative to the presentation of negative (balloon burst) 
or positive (the balloon and score increased) feedback stimuli, and were baseline corrected 
based on the mean activity from -100 to 0 ms. We applied an automatic artifact rejection 
algorithm implemented in Brain Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, 
Germany) that was based on four criteria: The maximum gradient allowed for an epoch was 
50 μV/ms, we rejected those segments where the activity exceeded +/- 100 μV, the lowest 
activity allowed was 0.5 μV, and the maximum absolute difference between the minimum and 
maximum voltages in an epoch was 200 μV. This was necessary for removing the artifacts 
still contaminating the data after ICA correction. A minimum of 19 artifact-free epochs were 
required in the negative feedback condition in order for a participant’s data to be included. Of 
those participants whose data remained in the analysis, the mean number of kept segments in 
the negative feedback condition was 33.2 (SD = 10.9; range: 19 – 65).  
Epochs locked to negative and positive feedback stimuli were averaged separately; 
then, difference waves were created by subtracting the positive feedback-locked waveform 
from the negative feedback-locked waveform (see also Fein & Chang, 2008). A grand average 
ERP waveform was calculated for the difference waves to determine the latency range of each 
component: FRN and P3. An automatic peak detection algorithm was used for quantifying 
ERP component peaks at three frontocentral electrodes: E11 (closest to the Fz position), E6 
(closest to the FCz position), and Cz. These electrodes were used in previous BART studies 
(Euser et al., 2011; Fein & Chang, 2008) and also showed maximum amplitudes in the present 
study. FRN was determined as the most negative peak within the time interval of 200 – 300 
ms. P3 was measured as the most positive point between 300 – 600 ms. Individual waveforms 
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were visually inspected to ensure that the algorithm identified the local maxima in the given 
time interval. 
 
Data Analysis 
Standardized values (z-scores) were calculated for the main outcome variables of each 
EF task (see section Neuropsychological Measures) in the final sample. Afterwards, an EF 
index was created as the arithmetic mean of the three z-transformed variables. Participants 
were assigned to low EF (equal or below -0.24) or high EF (above -0.23) groups based on a 
median split on the EF index. 
FRN and P3 amplitudes and latencies from difference waves were entered into two-
way mixed ANOVAs with Group (low EF, high EF) as a between-subjects factor, and 
Electrode (Fz, FCz, Cz) as a within-subjects factor. The Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon (ε) 
correction (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was used when necessary. Original df values and 
corrected p values are reported together with partial eta squares (ηp
2
) as the measure of effect 
size. To control for Type I error, we used Tukey HSD tests for pair-wise comparisons. For 
correlational analysis, FRN and P3 amplitudes were used from the difference waves. EEG and 
behavioral data were analyzed with Brain Vision Analyzer software, STATISTICA 11, and 
IBM SPSS Statistics 19. 
 
Results 
Sample Characteristics and Behavioral Results 
Table 2 demonstrates the between-group differences in demographic variables, rating 
scale measures, EF performance, and behavioral measures of the BART. There was no 
significant difference in any rating scale measures or BART outcome variables (mean 
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adjusted number of pumps, number of balloon bursts, mean score in the balloon before bursts, 
total score) between participants with low EFs and high EFs (all ps > .1). 
 
ERP Results 
Grand average ERP waveforms split by feedback type and difference waves for each 
group are presented in Figure 2. The amplitude distribution of FRN and P3 components (from 
the difference waves) for each group is presented in Figure 3. The FRN was present on the 
difference waves at each electrode for both groups, and the FRN amplitude was largest at 
electrode Cz. After presenting negative feedback stimuli, the FRN was followed by a large P3 
component. In contrast, positive feedback stimuli evoked a positive potential in the FRN 
latency window, and the subsequent P3 was absent. 
A 2 (Group) * 3 (Electrode) ANOVA was performed on FRN peak amplitude. The 
main effect of Group was significant, F(1, 30) = 7.36, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .20, and also the main 
effect of Electrode was significant, F(2, 60) = 9.87, ε = .590, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .25. The FRN 
peak amplitude was larger (more negative) in the high EF group than in the low EF group (-
6.31 μV vs. -3.52 μV). The same 2 * 3 ANOVA was performed on FRN peak latency. The 
main effect of Group was marginally significant, F(1, 30) = 4.03, p = .054, ηp
2 
= .12, while the 
main effect of Electrode was significant, F(2, 60) = 36.65, ε = .743, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .55. The 
FRN latency was slightly delayed in the high EF group compared to the low EF group (254 
ms vs. 247 ms).  
A 2 (Group) * 3 (Electrode) ANOVA was performed on P3 peak amplitude. The main 
effect of Electrode was significant, F(2, 60) = 65.94, ε = .753, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .69, and the 
Electrode * Group interaction was also significant, F(2, 60) = 7.30, ε = .753, p < .01, ηp
2 
= 
.20. Pair-wise tests revealed that the P3 amplitude was enhanced in the high EF group 
compared to the low EF group, but only at electrode Cz (21.92 μV vs. 16.47 μV, p < .05). The 
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same 2 * 3 ANOVA was performed on P3 peak latency. The main effect of Group was 
significant, F(1, 30) = 4.27, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .12, indicating that the P3 was delayed in the high 
EF group compared to the low EF group (363 ms vs. 349 ms). The main effect of Electrode 
was significant, as well, F(2, 60) = 4.92, ε = .727, p < .05, ηp
2 
= .14. 
Correlations were also run between ERP measures (FRN/P3 amplitude and latency) 
and EF index on the entire sample to check whether the results hold with a continuous 
approach. Results obtained from these analyses are in line with the ANOVA results (see 
Appendix). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Grand average ERP waveforms (left panel) after the onset of negative (grey) and 
positive (black) feedback split by group and electrode position. Difference waves (right panel) 
were calculated by subtracting the positive feedback-locked waveform from the negative 
feedback-locked waveform. Please note, positivity is plotted upwards. 
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Fig. 3. The scalp topography (amplitude distribution) of FRN and P3 components at the time 
of their maximum amplitude split by group. 
 
Correlations Between ERP Measures 
The FRN amplitude is plotted against P3 amplitude for the entire sample at each 
electrode separately in Figure 4. Significant correlations were found at electrode FCz and Cz: 
Larger (more negative) FRN amplitude was associated with larger P3 amplitude. At the same 
time, we did not find significant correlation between FRN and P3 amplitude at electrode Fz. 
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Fig. 4. Scatter plots illustrating the association between FRN and P3 amplitude at each 
electrode. Pearson correlations calculated for the entire sample are presented below each 
figure. In order to be consistent with Fig. 2, in the amplitude scale of FRN, positivity is 
plotted upwards.  
 
Discussion 
The present study explored the neuro-cognitive correlates of uncertain decision 
making by comparing feedback processing during the BART between adults of low EF and 
high EF. We found no between-group differences in any of the behavioral measures of the 
BART. On the contrary, the FRN, time-locked to the negative feedback presented, was 
enhanced and delayed in the high EF group compared to the low EF group. To a lesser extent, 
the P3 following the FRN was also found to be larger and delayed in the high EF group. We 
observed moderate correlations between the amplitude of FRN and P3 for the entire sample. 
 
Interpretation of ERP Findings 
According to the theoretical framework of model-based vs. model-free learning (see 
Table 1), executive control processes and hypothesis-driven strategies seem to be less useful 
in tasks with implicit rules and decisions under ambiguity (Filoteo, Lauritzen, & Maddox, 
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2010; Frank, O'Reilly, & Curran, 2006; Fu & Anderson, 2008), such as the BART. This 
framework predicted that high EF participants would follow a model-based strategy. 
However, decision making under ambiguity does not necessarily require high EF performance 
(Brand et al., 2006); and therefore, participants with high EFs might not take advantage of 
their superior EFs. In a broader sense, the BART might also involve some decisions under 
risk. In the current study, the risky nature of the task was presented to participants via task 
instructions. They were aware of the increasing amount of reward for each successive pump, 
and also of the fact that pumping the balloon too large, it would have popped. However, no 
explicit information was provided regarding the optimal number of balloon pumps, or the 
equation that determined the probability of balloon popping on a given pump. Therefore, 
participants could not recall an exact problem solving strategy in order to evaluate how many 
pumps are appropriate for the optimal final outcome: Although the probability of a balloon 
burst increased as a function of balloon size, a particular balloon burst could have happened 
after any pump. Accordingly, the probability of a balloon increase or balloon burst could have 
been evaluated only by trial and error learning, and participants could have made decisions 
under a quite good approximation of risk only in the later trials (Fecteau et al., 2007).  
Given this ambiguity in the BART, in our interpretation, larger FRN in the high EF 
than in the low EF participants may represent the different task-solving strategies of the two 
groups. High EF participants could have worked up internal models on the basis of their 
experiences gathered during early trials of the task. Leaning on their enhanced control 
processes, high EF individuals might have solved the task by testing outcome expectations 
derived from these models. However, the level of ambiguity in the BART precludes an 
explicit access to the task structure (Fecteau et al., 2007; Lejuez et al., 2002). Therefore, in 
case of using a model-based strategy, several outcomes could have represented prediction 
errors associated with motivational salience (Talmi et al., 2013). This suggests that the 
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internal model developed did not meet the outcome, and as a result, the violated expectations 
might have induced a larger FRN. This argument is in line with the current P3 results, since 
the P3 was also larger and delayed in the high EF group. Again, a model-based strategy 
requires constant updating of working memory during the task, while a hypothesis-free 
solution does not necessarily involve this. The P3 amplitude also reflects the amount of 
information transmitted to working memory (Polich & Kok, 1995); therefore, an enhanced P3 
might furthermore indicate a model-based strategy used by the high EF group.  
When outcome probabilities are largely unpredictable, the enhanced processing of 
actual outcomes and their integration to previous reinforcement history might also denote a 
strategy to fulfill task goals (Mushtaq et al., 2011). This strategy yielding larger FRN and P3 
amplitudes could be a consequence of enhanced cognitive control per se. Therefore, we 
cannot rule out the possibility of this more parsimonious interpretation of the observed group 
differences in ERPs. 
However, evidence for altered feedback processing in different task-solving strategies 
under ambiguous decision making was observed previously in the weather prediction task 
(Rustemeier, Schwabe, & Bellebaum, 2013). In this probabilistic classification learning task, 
the FRN amplitude did not differ between participants using a declarative and a 
nondeclarative strategy. At the same time, the feedback P3 reflecting conscious cognitive 
processes was larger in the declarative learners’ group. Those participants who followed a 
nondeclarative strategy showed more success in learning (more correct responses) than those 
who followed the declarative strategy. Even though the high EF group in our study did not 
show weaker performance at the behavioral level, we think that their model-based strategy is 
similar in some degree to the declarative strategy identified in the study of Rustemeier et al. 
(2013). It is important to note, however, that the classification of learning strategies in the 
weather prediction task and the EF group assignment in the present study is rather different. 
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In addition, the specific details of putative internal models and explicit strategies are unknown 
in our study. Nevertheless, more evidence should be accumulated to elucidate whether 
processes of implicit (procedural) learning are sufficient to adjust performance in uncertain 
conditions or higher-order executive control processes are needed (Mushtaq et al., 2011).   
According to the correlational results, FRN and P3 might indicate similar and/or 
related processes in BART performance. Generally, in performance monitoring tasks, an early 
frontocentral negativity is usually followed by a sharp frontocentral positivity and by a later 
parietal positivity (Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 2014). The early complex might 
signal the need for implementing cognitive control. Specifically, an enhanced neural response 
to motivationally salient events (i.e., balloon bursts) could orient attention to relevant 
information about task-performance and increase subsequent adaptation if needed (Ullsperger 
et al., 2014). This mechanism is probably present both in the low EF and high EF groups, 
regardless of the exact strategy used. 
 
Oversensitivity to Negative Events 
Altered sensitivity to negative outcomes could be a manifestation of the model-based 
strategy suggested to be used by the high EF group. Either an enhancement or an attenuation 
of the FRN amplitude has been observed in regard to various neurological and psychiatric 
syndromes indicating maladaptive feedback processing (Onoda et al., 2010; Talmi et al., 
2013). Therefore, increased FRN could reflect an increased sensitivity to losses or negative 
outcomes. The FRN signals the motivational impact of feedback for task performance, as well 
(Yeung et al., 2005). As a consequence, individuals with high EFs might have considered 
balloon bursts as more significant negative events than those with low EFs, since these 
outcomes might have violated their internal models. In addition, they might have felt that each 
negative feedback weakened their total performance. Euser et al. (2013) found reduced P3 
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amplitudes for both negative and positive feedback in the BART among high-risk adolescents 
with a parental history of substance use disorders compared to normal risk controls. In their 
interpretation, this might have reflected a weaker processing of feedback and suggested a 
hyposensitivity to future consequences. Accordingly, we presume that the increased P3 
amplitude in the high EF group might show an enhanced attention to further process salient 
events of motivational importance. 
 
Interpretation of Behavioral Findings 
We assumed that we would not find between-group differences in the BART 
behavioral performance, since the task involves mainly decisions under ambiguity (Campbell 
et al., 2013; Fecteau et al., 2007), and according to the notion of Brand et al. (2006), these 
decisions depend on the individual level of EFs in a lesser degree. The observed null-finding 
is in line with the hypothesis that EFs and behavioral performance on the BART are 
independent from one another. 
At the same time, the present behavioral findings do not support previous evidence 
(Fecteau et al., 2007; Helfinstein et al., 2014) suggesting that higher EFs are related to a risk-
averse response style (more cautious responses). The decreased behavioral performance of 
high EF participants presumed according to the model-based strategy should have been 
manifested in lower total score, but we did not find significant difference in this outcome 
variable. However, as we investigated the BART performance of a nonclinical adult sample, it 
is not obligatory to obtain group differences at the behavioral level, since EFs have been 
considered to be intact in these individuals (cf. Campbell et al., 2013). 
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Clinical Implications 
As mentioned in the Introduction, impaired decision making is a common cognitive 
characteristic of several psychiatric syndromes such as ADHD, depression, or substance 
abuse (Onoda et al., 2010). The high co-morbidity rate between these disorders may mirror 
the contribution of a general psychopathology factor (Caspi et al., 2013; Lahey et al., 2012). 
General psychopathology is associated with weaker cognitive control or EFs (Caspi et al., 
2013). However, it is controversial how atypical EFs influence feedback processing in clinical 
syndromes, even though these mechanisms jointly contribute to adaptive decision making.  
As an important syndrome of enormous clinical and economical impact, alcoholism is 
associated with impulse control problems in risk-taking, and it is thought to be caused by the 
impairment of EFs (Campbell et al., 2013; Fein & Chang, 2008). It was previously shown in a 
BART experiment on treatment-naïve alcoholic participants that behavioral outcome of the 
task did not correlate with the FRN amplitude (Fein & Chang, 2008). However, a negative 
association was shown between FRN and the family history density of alcoholism. This 
indicated an attenuated sensitivity to negative feedback in participants with an inherited risk 
for developing alcoholism. Alterations in frontostriatal circuits and in EFs have been 
considered as potential root causes of this attenuation (Fein & Chang, 2008). Nevertheless, 
without behavioral measurements of EFs, the association between EFs and the FRN remained 
unclear in this study. 
Another behavioral study found that chronic alcohol users made less optimal decisions 
in the BART than their healthy counterparts (Campbell et al., 2013). The authors suggested 
that this was caused by EF impairments in the clinical group. However, as it was also 
presented in that study, chronic alcohol use could lead to performance attenuation in a broad 
range of cognitive functions, which could not entirely confirm their proposed explanation. 
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Our results could indirectly contribute to the investigation of alcoholism by 
demonstrating the relevance of EFs in feedback processing with healthy young adults. Since 
modulation of the FRN has been proposed as a potential biomarker in psychopathology, a 
clearer understanding of the functional significance of this component and the different 
neural/cognitive systems supporting decision making is essential for further studies (Talmi et 
al., 2013). 
 
Limitations and Further Aspects 
Some issues merit consideration when interpreting the current results. Labeling the 
two groups as “low EF” and “high EF” was somewhat arbitrary, and it could only be 
understood as compared to the median of the actual EF index of our sample. Without 
normative scores for each EF task, we cannot be certain of the performance range (i.e., normal 
EFs or high EFs) to which the whole sample could have been assigned. 
We selected the EF tasks on the basis of the three-factor model of Miyake et al. (2000) 
that has appeared to be robust using complex EF tasks, as well (Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & 
Pulkkinen, 2003). It is probable that Verbal Fluency Task and Listening Span Task might also 
tap verbal skills as much as EF subprocesses (see also the task impurity problem: Burgess, 
1997). However, conducting this study with mostly female undergraduate students might 
assure that the observed differences between low and high EF groups stem from differences in 
the underlying EF subprocesses. In addition, BART performance does not involve a verbal 
component; thus, it is unlikely that ERP results are related to verbal skills. At the same time, 
the present results should be replicated by defining low EF and high EF groups on the basis of 
simpler EF task performance. 
We assume that the low EF group could have chosen between response options 
following somatic markers instead of conscious strategies. However, in order to directly prove 
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this assumption, autonomic responses (e.g., skin conductance measures, heart rate variability) 
should be investigated in future studies.  
Finally, it should be further tested whether impaired EFs in a broader sense might 
deteriorate BART performance at the behavioral level (cf. Campbell et al., 2013). In terms of 
individual differences in EF dimension, the investigation of treatment effects, the effect of 
fatigue, or transcranial magnetic stimulation are worth considering in order to confirm and 
replicate the present results both at the behavioral and neural levels. 
 
Conclusion  
The different steps of decision making could be influenced by multiple factors, for 
instance, the number of available response options, the information about related outcome 
probabilities, individual differences in cognitive state, performance, and personality traits, the 
required effort and time available for a given choice, and the presence of other participants. 
Among these variables, this study focused on how individual differences in EF performance 
modulate feedback processing during decision making, which has not been clarified so far. 
In sum, the present results emphasize the general role of cognitive control amongst the 
hidden factors of risky decision making by providing evidence for the EF level modulating 
FRN and P3 components. We found that individuals with high EFs might have followed a 
model-based strategy in task-solving, and we also propose that superior EFs might not be 
needed in optimal BART performance. The presented method is useful to shed light on the 
underlying strategies in decision making as shown by the dissociation between findings at the 
behavioral and brain level. These results could have clinical implications since altered FRN 
has been interpreted as a risk indicator in psychopathology. 
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Appendix. Correlation coefficients between ERP measures and EF index. 
 EF index 
  r rs 
FRN(A)_Fz -.376* -.367* 
FRN(A)_FCz -.391* -.370* 
FRN(A)_Cz -.378* -.318+ 
FRN(lat)_Fz .176 .189 
FRN(lat)_FCz .286 .366* 
FRN(lat)_Cz .180 .227 
P3(A)_Fz -.265 -.266 
P3(A)_FCz .040 .049 
P3(A)_Cz .392* .488** 
P3(lat)_Fz .268 .362* 
P3(lat)_FCz .333+ .463** 
P3(lat)_Cz -.111 -.053 
Note. A = amplitude; lat = latency; rs = Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.  
N = 32 
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
